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This paper explores the meaning of the developmental state for spatial economic policy in 
South Africa. Two main questions are addressed: do provincial governments have a role to 
play in promoting economic prosperity, and to what extent do current provincial policies 
possess the attributes of a developmental state? These are defined as the ability to plan 
longer-term, to focus key partners on a common agenda, and to mobilise state resources to 
build productive capabilities. The paper argues that the developmental state must harness the 
power of government at every level to ensure that each part of the country develops to its 
potential. However, current provincial capacity is uneven, and weakest where support is 
needed most. Many provinces seem to have partial strategies and lack the wherewithal for 
sustained implementation. Coordination across government appears to be poor. The paper 
concludes by suggesting ways provincial policies could be strengthened. 
Keywords: developmental state; provincial economic development policy; spatial 
development; government coordination 
 
1. Introduction 
There is renewed interest in the idea of the developmental state in Africa. This is partly a 
reaction to the failure of the pro-market reforms under the Washington Consensus to deliver 
socioeconomic progress. Instead, many on the continent have looked towards the East Asian 
experience, where governments have played a leading role in strengthening growth and 
spreading prosperity (Chang, 2008; Turok, 2008; Gumede, 2009; Parsons, 2009). Current 
interest also reflects a broader shift in thinking about the economic functions of the state 
following the global financial crisis. For many years it was fashionable to argue that markets 
are better mechanisms of resource allocation than the state. Yet, the slump has forced 
unprecedented state activism in advanced economies to rescue failing banks and to spur 
recovery through major fiscal stimuli costing some $11 000 billion (BBC, 2009). It has 
magnified the concerns of governments in many less developed countries (LDCs) about their 
resilience to external economic shocks, including unstable demand for their commodities, 
volatile energy and food prices, falling foreign direct investment (FDI) and reduced 
remittances from migrant workers. 
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South Africa faces particular challenges that explain its interest in the developmental state 
(The Presidency, 2008a, 2009; Turok, 2008; Gumede, 2009; Parsons, 2009). Only two fifths 
of its working age adults are in employment, compared with two thirds in many other 
countries (OECD, 2008; ILO, 2009). Self-employment and the small and micro-enterprise 
sector also appear much smaller than in most LDCs (The Presidency, 2008b). Large income 
inequalities are worsened by distorted settlement patterns, which trap poor communities in 
peripheral urban townships and remote rural areas (Harrison et al., 2008; Van Donk et al., 
2008). Such problems reflect the skewed structure of the economy, with its concentrated 
pattern of ownership, its narrow base dominated by mining and financial services, and the 
historic marginalisation of the black population from opportunities of all kinds. Recent 
economic performance has been sluggish by international standards and skewed towards low 
value consumer services such as retail, telecoms, security and health (Aron et al., 2009). A 
worsening trade deficit caused by rising imports to supply the consumer boom has been 
financed by short-term capital inflows rather than long-term investment in domestic 
production to create jobs and diversify exports (The Presidency, 2008a,b; Du Toit & Van 
Tonder, 2009). Increasing external demand for the country’s basic commodities has 
strengthened the currency and damaged industrial output and jobs. 
Over the last 16 years the state has struggled with these structural challenges that require 
socioeconomic and institutional change (The Presidency, 2008b). Extreme social and spatial 
inequalities coincide with limited economic dynamism: ‘our growth has been largely 
pedestrian. The structure of our economy has not changed significantly in a hundred years’ 
(The Presidency, 2009:6). State institutions tend to operate in silos with inconsistent 
mandates that don’t meld well together (Boraine et al., 2006; Harrison et al., 2008; Public 
Service Commission, 2007, 2009). The capacity for strategic planning is very uneven across 
spheres and sectors of government (The Presidency, 2008b). Public services such as 
education, health, water and sanitation are worst in places of historical neglect, causing a 
rising tide of community protest (DBSA, 2008; National Treasury, 2008). Bottlenecks in 
infrastructure, congestion and skills shortages constrain growth in the cities (Turok & Parnell, 
2009). There is little tradition of engaging civil society and the business sector in the policy 
process, and progress to rectify this has been slow (McLennan & Munslow, 2009; Public 
Service Commission, 2009). 
The post-2009 government has expressed a new commitment to long-term planning and 
coordination with the creation of a National Planning Commission (The Presidency, 2009). 
There are pressures to shift economic policy from the previous regime’s cautious emphasis 
on inflation targeting and macroeconomic stability (Chang, 2008; Parsons, 2009). The 
creation of decent work and sustainable livelihoods has become the first of five cross-cutting 
national priorities (ANC, 2009; The Presidency, 2009). Yet considerable uncertainty remains 
as to how to steer the economic trajectory in a more productive, durable and yet labour-
absorbing direction. Centralised systems of planning and coordination are emphasised, to the 
neglect of provincial (regional) and local institutions (Gumede, 2009).  
The purpose of this paper is to explore the meaning of the developmental state for spatial 
(sub-national) economic policy in South Africa and other developing countries. Two main 
questions are addressed: what is the role of provincial governments, particularly in promoting 
economic prosperity, and to what extent do current provincial economic policies possess the 
attributes of a developmental state? These attributes are defined as the ability to plan longer-
term, to focus key partners on a common agenda, and to mobilise state resources to build 
productive capabilities.  
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The evidence derives partly from a survey of provincial economic development departments 
carried out by the author in October-November 2009. The survey was sent to heads of 
departments, who were questioned about their policy objectives, approaches, achievements 
and constraints. In some cases other officials were delegated to draft the responses, although 
they were usually signed off by the head of department. In all cases the answers were 
followed up with further questions of clarification and elaboration to provide further details 
and to avoid ambiguities. The survey was supplemented with a review of supporting 
provincial documents, including their development strategies, annual reports and budget 
statements.  
The underlying argument of the paper is that a developmental state needs to harness the 
power of government at every level to ensure that each part of the country builds on its 
strengths and develops to its potential. Yet current provincial capacity is uneven and weakest 
in the places that need most support. Many provinces seem to have partial strategies and lack 
the wherewithal for sustained implementation. There are overlapping roles and 
responsibilities and poor coordination across government. The paper concludes by suggesting 
ways in which provincial policies might be strengthened so as to reinforce the efforts of other 
government spheres and assist the national development agenda to be more sensitive to 
variable regional and local circumstances. 
The structure is as follows. Section 2 defines the concept of the developmental state, 
Section 3 considers alternative approaches to spatial development, and Section 4 offers 
empirical evidence on provincial policies. The various subsections discuss the provinces’ 
objectives, activities, resources, external partners, achievements and concerns. The final 
section draws conclusions and makes recommendations.  
 
2. Defining the developmental state 
There is a growing literature on the developmental state (Robertson & White, 1998; Woo-
Cummings, 1999; Turok, 2008; Van Donk et al., 2008; Gumede, 2009; Edigheji, 2010). 
Drawing some of the principal ideas and evidence together, effective developmental states 
seem to have at least three important features. First, they are capable of planning ahead and 
making long-term strategic decisions beyond pragmatic responses to political pressures and 
problems as they emerge. They have analytical capacity to separate the causes of problems 
from their symptoms and consequences, and organisational capacity to focus on the 
underlying issues for more durable outcomes. Lack of productive work lies at the core of 
many aspects of poverty and exclusion, so employment tends to be a primary objective 
(Turok, 2010). Such states are also capable of early action to anticipate difficulties and to 
minimise the risks of problems occurring or escalating. They pursue the national interest over 
narrow sectional interests. Activities that create value and enhance the capabilities of people 
and firms are favoured over opportunistic, ‘rent-seeking’ behaviour that lobbies for special 
privileges, or extracts value from others without contributing to overall productivity or well-
being (Sen, 1999; Gumede, 2009). A priority in countries like South Africa is to shift the 
economic development path in a more inclusive and dynamic direction. It is not enough to 
expand the output of the existing structure and reproduce its deficiencies, or to enrich a 
narrow section of the previously disadvantaged population through administrative or legal 
mechanisms. Sustained economic success comes from linking financial rewards to productive 
activity and long-term performance. 
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Second, to promote change requires boldness and concerted effort on the part of government. 
It seeks to act with sufficient scale and collective weight to influence established growth 
patterns. It considers the economic impact of all it does, and understands how state 
procurement, regulation and services can boost – or hold back – the creation of jobs. 
Different parts of the state are aligned so that its full powers as a major investor, purchaser, 
employer, regulator and provider of infrastructure and services are brought to bear 
consistently. For example, in the urban arena it is important to connect policies for housing, 
transport, land use and basic services in order to contain low density sprawl and engineer 
more inclusive and efficient cities (Turok & Parnell, 2009). In the industrial field, 
programmes concerned with training, R&D, infrastructure and trade policy require 
coordination to maximise their impact (Kraak, 2009). In the employment sphere, linking 
together schools, colleges, job advisory services and employers can smooth people’s 
pathways into work and make the labour market function more effectively.  
Otherwise, the development agenda may be undermined by contradictory state actions and 
speculative tendencies in the private sector looking for easy returns. Integrated actions enable 
the state to initiate change, and not simply to accommodate trends and respond to events as 
they unfold. Developmental states invest to release latent economic potential, encourage 
enterprise and make better use of neglected resources such as labour and land. They intervene 
to improve or develop the market by creating finance institutions to provide patient risk 
capital, encouraging long-term business decisions and improved management, and 
stimulating productive activity in forms or places that may not occur spontaneously. The 
logic goes beyond compensating for market inefficiencies, or promoting welfare in isolation 
from economic opportunity. It is about building the human capabilities and culture to support 
a resilient and dynamic economy (Sen, 1999; Evans, 2009). 
Third, developmental states are democratic in the sense that different actors and interests are 
brought together to define a common purpose and sense of direction (Robertson & White, 
1998; Edigheji, 2010). Democratic processes channel knowledge of what public goods are 
most needed by citizens and firms. Partnerships with business, labour and community 
organisations help to share ideas and resources, and build support and mutual commitment to 
activities that enhance value, encourage hard work and self-improvement, and increase 
employment. Cohesive institutions can instil confidence in the future and help to draw in 
wider investment, skills, effort and energy, thereby stretching resources further. Collaboration 
between different spheres and sectors of government is also important to avoid wasteful 
competition and duplication of effort. For example, the sequence and location of state 
investments in transport, energy, digital, low carbon and community infrastructure need 
careful alignment to ensure compatibility and to maximise local jobs. There may be 
significant productivity gains and spinoffs for local suppliers from this kind of joint 
endeavour, compared with the various state organs going it alone. Special initiatives and ad 
hoc projects are likely to be less effective than sustained efforts to reconfigure and integrate 
mainstream policies. 
Of course, there is no guarantee of success and there may be risks associated with some of 
these features of developmental government. The focus of the combined effort may be 
misdirected, coordination may constrain initiative, and cooperation may delay decisions. 
Structures must be designed through a creative process of exploration depending on the 
circumstances and inherited institutions, and there are always difficult balances to be struck. 
One of the tensions is between centralised and decentralised systems of planning and 
implementation. There may be economies of scale and greater leverage with the former, but 
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more flexibility, integration and responsiveness to economic realities and opportunities with 
the latter. 
 
3. Spatial development policies 
There is increasing recognition that localities and regions matter in important ways to 
national prosperity. According to Storper, for example, ‘the region is a key source of 
development’ (1995:191). Porter has long argued that ‘The enduring competitive advantages 
in a global economy are often heavily localised, arising from concentrations of highly 
specialised skills and knowledge, institutions, rivalry, related businesses, and sophisticated 
customers’ (1998:90). Localities and regions are not inert containers for economic activity, 
and spatial policy is not a zero-sum game concerned simply with the distribution of 
resources. Places are the locus of land and labour markets, supply chains, and markets for 
many products and services. These economic interactions create important positive and 
negative spillovers or externalities. They can influence economic outcomes in helpful or 
harmful ways, affecting the extent to which value is created and enhanced, and have a direct 
bearing on aggregate productivity, innovation and long-run growth. Places also have distinct 
economic needs and potentials, depending on a wide range of factors.  
At the risk of oversimplification, we can identify two broad approaches to spatial policy. The 
first is conceived of as narrowing the gap between leading and lagging regions by diverting 
investment from the former to the latter (Pike et al., 2006). This may be between regions 
within a particular nation, or between nations. The emphasis is on improving the business 
environment of the poorest regions through basic infrastructure and financial subsidies 
(‘hard’ assets). If the target is FDI, additional efforts may be made to lower business taxes 
and relax national labour regulations and environmental standards, especially if the approach 
is market-oriented and hands-off. Manufacturing is the usual target of attention, on the 
grounds that it is the main propulsive sector – more mobile than primary industries and 
services, with larger multipliers and externally traded products. Depending on the incentive 
packages, labour- or capital-intensive assembly operations are more likely to relocate than 
strategic, higher order functions. Business relocation from high cost environments and 
congested regions can benefit the national economy by reducing inflationary pressures. 
National government is typically in control for predictability and standardisation, and to limit 
competitive bidding between regions. Before 1994, South Africa had a long history of trying 
to attract assembly plants to the former Bantustans, most of which closed when the incentives 
expired because they were fundamentally unviable (DTI, 2006; Harrison et al., 2008). 
More sophisticated, hands-on policies of this genre seek to create integrated industrial 
complexes with stronger backward and forward linkages to embed plants within the region 
and capture additional business activity and jobs. The logic partly involves minimising 
transport costs by concentrating particular value chains in one location, such as export 
processing zones or growth poles (Gordon & McCann, 2000). Supplier development 
programmes nurture indigenous firms so as to build the skills and capabilities to produce 
intermediate inputs for the foreign plants, or to attract second-tier suppliers. ‘After-care’ 
programmes seek to persuade inward investors of the overall cost savings from using local 
suppliers and to encourage plant upgrading to higher value functions, superior technologies 
and better environmental practices over time. FDI is seen less as an end in itself and more as 
a means of harnessing knowledge, techniques and best practices to develop the capacities of 
 5
domestic firms and workers to sell their products in broader markets (Gallagher & Zarsky, 
2007). 
This comes closer to the second approach to spatial policy, which has sometimes been 
described as ‘new regionalism’ or ‘new localism’ (Keating, 1998; Rogerson, 2009). The 
emphasis is on internally driven development, based on strong indigenous enterprises, 
reliable institutions and local endowments. This is more in tune with developmental state 
thinking in terms of building long-term productive capabilities and not expecting a quick fix. 
Growth from within is perceived to be more sustainable than attracting outside investment, 
since it develops greater resilience and adaptability to economic change. The policy is also 
aimed at realising the potential of all regions and not simply those most in need, in order to 
maintain and enhance the position of places in a more competitive global environment. In 
contemporary conditions, factor costs may be less important for determining regional 
competitiveness than for their ‘quality’, which stems from human capabilities, business 
networks, supporting institutions and mutual learning – i.e. resourcefulness rather than 
resources (Buck et al., 2005; Turok, 2004). The growth of local economic development 
(LED) in South Africa over the last decade is broadly consistent with this shift in thinking 
(Van der Heijden, 2008). The aim is to build local support organisations with the knowledge, 
skills and scope to experiment with development projects and identify what works best in 
different places.  
The basic approach varies internationally. The concept of industrial clusters has been 
particularly influential (Cooke & Morgan, 1998; Porter, 1998; Gordon & McCann, 2000). 
The core idea is that proximity between firms helps personal relationships to develop and 
builds trust. Local business networks promote a sense of shared interest and encourage 
longer-term thinking and greater risk taking. Firms act together for mutual benefit through 
business associations that provide common support services and encourage innovation. The 
result is local sector clusters that enjoy distinctive and differential advantages over other 
places. The public sector can assist by providing supporting finance and infrastructure to 
strengthen these networks. Local universities and investors can also help to translate 
scientific research into commercial products and processes. South Africa’s draft Regional 
Industrial Development Strategy (DTI, 2006) reflects these ideas in aiming to establish 
unique programmes in each region to develop local sector strengths through bottom-up 
partnerships with the private sector. 
A variation of this emphasises the economic advantages of scale and scope that flow from 
concentrated activity in cities. Cities increase the opportunities available to firms and 
workers, and reduce the risks to which they are exposed (Buck et al., 2005; World Bank, 
2009). Firms can find specialist skills more easily in a bigger labour pool, and have access to 
a greater range and better quality of shared business inputs and transport facilities. They gain 
from a thicker flow of information through informal contacts or movement of key workers, 
which helps to spread ideas about how to improve goods and services. The scale of activity 
determines the significance of these benefits – the larger the better. Density and variety add to 
the dynamism and creativity. South Africa’s National Spatial Development Perspective 
(NSDP) is consistent with this approach in encouraging economic infrastructure investment 
to focus on the country’s cities and major towns (Harrison et al., 2008; Turok & Parnell, 
2009). 
Cities are also part of broader economic systems and resource flows, located within regional, 
national and global contexts (Scott, 2001). They function as metropolitan service centres, 
transport gateways and logistics hubs within a larger hinterland, naturally spreading the 
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benefits of prosperity as they grow. Connectivity facilitates the supply of energy, food, water 
and other natural resources from their surrounding regions, and enables cities to contribute 
through remittances from employment, higher order services and technology diffusion. 
Prosperous cities are also linked into wider international networks to access knowledge, 
resources and markets. Coordination across government is important for consistency in 
infrastructure, skills, trade and industrial policy. Empowered local and regional state 
institutions can also promote more effective and integrated responses to the diverse problems 
and opportunities in different places – in other words, place-based solutions (Tomaney et al., 
2010). 
These approaches tend to be most developed in the global North. The challenges are clearly 
greater in the global South, given the higher incidence of poverty, wider territorial disparities, 
less developed infrastructure and skills, and more limited state organisational and financial 
capacity, especially at the local level. One of the underlying concerns associated with the 
second approach is that local and regional gaps may widen over time, especially in the South 
African context, given the apartheid legacy of spatial inequality. In places with strong 
productive capabilities and robust institutions, these gaps may widen further in the absence of 
countervailing central government mechanisms to redirect resources and spread prosperity, 
such as major fiscal transfers, improved connectivity and capacity building. 
 
4. Provincial economic development in South Africa  
4.1 Introduction 
We can identify aspects of both approaches in South African spatial policy since 1994. The 
approval of a coherent spatial framework for the country has been complicated by political 
and departmental differences (Harrison et al., 2008; Turok & Parnell, 2009). For example, the 
DTI’s Industrial Development Zones (IDZs) tend towards the first approach in subsidising 
inward investment in lagging regions, whereas the aim of the NSDP is to focus productive 
investment in the cities and major towns.  
Economic development is also complicated by ambiguity about the specific roles and 
responsibilities of the three spheres of government. The nine provinces have some 
constitutional autonomy, reflecting the early 1990s political settlement, but are also obliged 
to work within national legislation and policies. They are required to prepare growth and 
development strategies framed by national priorities and adapted to distinct local needs and 
opportunities. A series of national initiatives has had a strong influence on provincial 
programmes in recent years, including the 2006 Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative 
(ASGISA) and the 2007 National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF). The provinces are 
also required to work with local municipalities, assist their capacity-building efforts and 
encourage consistent LED initiatives. Municipalities are required to prepare Integrated 
Development Plans (IDPs) containing a LED strategy. 
The overlap between the three spheres creates the potential for policy incoherence, gaps and 
omissions, duplication of effort, confused accountability and uncertainty on the part of 
business and other stakeholders. The extent of the problem is discussed below. Suffice to say 
at this point that there is a general challenge to clarify responsibilities so as to minimise 
confusion and duplication, without stifling initiative and creativity.  
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 4.2 Uneven economic conditions 
Provincial policies are framed within a context of generally high but uneven levels of 
worklessness. Unemployment in South Africa is very high by international standards (ILO, 
2009) at 24.4% in the final quarter of 2009, up from 21.9% a year before (Table 1). The 
‘employment rate’ is a better indicator of economic activity and labour market conditions 
because it takes account of people discouraged from looking for work by the lack of jobs. 
Only 41.5% of the working age population was in formal or informal employment in the final 
quarter of 2009, down from 44.8% a year before. Nearly a million jobs were lost over that 
period of the recession. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Socioeconomic conditions vary widely across the country, reflected in diverse labour market 
circumstances (Table 1). The employment rate is exceptionally low in Limpopo (LP) and the 
Eastern Cape (EC), where the proportion of adults who have a job of any kind is under one in 
three. This suggests high levels of economic inactivity and poverty. Unemployment is 
relatively high in the North West (NW), Eastern Cape (EC), Limpopo (LP) and Mpumalanga 
(MP). Looking across the top two rows of Table 1, the inconsistency between the two 
indicators shows the importance of having more than one measure of labour market 
conditions.  
In Kwazulu Natal (KZN) the picture is mixed with a low unemployment rate and a low 
employment rate. This indicates that many people are detached from the jobs market and not 
looking for work, presumably in the rural hinterland. The reverse applies in Gauteng (GP), 
with a high unemployment rate and a high employment rate. High economic participation 
reflects inward migration of people seeking work and is generally a positive feature for the 
provincial economy, although dissatisfaction levels may be high if people can’t find work. 
Only the Western Cape (WC) is better placed than the national average on both indicators, 
reflecting a relatively strong and diverse economy, and higher skills. Even so, the level of 
worklessness is still very high by international standards. 
The impact of the downturn has been quite different across the provinces (Table 1), although 
the data is subject to variability as it is based on a sample survey. The largest net job losses 
were in Gauteng, which accounted for nearly two fifths (38%) of the national total. Gauteng 
lost nearly one in 12 of the jobs it had the year before – a major blow for the country’s 
industrial heartland. The North West came off worse in relative terms, having lost one in 
eight of its jobs. These are major shocks with profound consequences for households and 
communities. Other provinces that were less affected by the onset of recession may 
experience delayed knock-on effects from reduced remittances and return migration from 
Gauteng, KZN and mining areas in the North West. 
 
4.3 Provincial aims and objectives 
The economic objectives of the provinces seem quite varied. Table 2 captures words and 
phrases used in their strategy documents and survey responses, with conventional economic 
aims listed in the left column and broader goals in the right. ‘Growth’, ‘sustainable growth’ 
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and ‘employment’ are ubiquitous, although they offer few supporting objectives to elaborate. 
Poverty reduction also features quite strongly and in various guises – livelihoods, informal 
economy and food security. Other responses vary more widely between the provinces. A 
positive interpretation is that they are making their own strategic choices in response to 
different local conditions, rather than following a national formula. For example, 
‘diversification’ is important in places with a narrow economic base, such as the Northern 
and Eastern Cape and Free State, whereas Gauteng aspires more towards innovation and the 
knowledge economy. Yet the responses are generally rather thin, with each province 
specifying few objectives, and there is insufficient detail or specificity to be confident that 
each province really has a distinctive agenda.  
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
In addition, very few provinces mention objectives one might have anticipated, relating to 
productivity, enterprise, value creation or average incomes. Considering the apartheid legacy, 
two other surprising omissions are human skills and capabilities and the distorted spatial 
economy, including the urban-rural imbalance and the challenges of the former Bantustans 
and dormitory townships. Overall, there is little sense of the strategic growth path envisaged 
and the likely drivers of development. There are also few clues as to the roles to be played by 
the state at different levels or the private sector.  
 
4.4 Practical activities 
The economic activities and projects undertaken seem to follow a broadly similar pattern, 
with some important differences (Table 3). All provinces are engaged in attracting inward 
investment and encouraging local firms to export to wider markets. These efforts seem quite 
generalised in terms of target industries. Yet they all also favour a sectoral approach to some 
of their support schemes. Many of the sectors they target reflect national priorities, such as 
tourism, call centres, agro-processing, automotive production and minerals beneficiation. 
Almost all provinces provide advice, training and financial assistance to SMMEs (small, 
medium and micro enterprises) and cooperatives. It is not made clear whether the types of 
support differ from those provided by other branches of government. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Besides those mentioned above, there do not seem to be many other common activities. 
Considerable effort seems to be devoted to investment attraction and business development, 
but far less to the business environment – physical infrastructure, human resources and 
enabling institutions. It is possible these are regarded as the prerogative of other parts of 
government. Nevertheless, one would have expected an integrated growth strategy to make 
reference to these vital ingredients of economic development, especially given the way they 
have been neglected in recent decades (DBSA, 2008). Firms cannot grow without an 
effective supply of land, infrastructure and skilled workers, and coordination of these inputs 
is important to maximise their synergies and embed them effectively into the local economy. 
Investment in training is important in a recession to help redundant workers find alternative 




4.5 Financial and staff resources 
Table 4 considers provincial resources for economic development. The figures exclude 
ancillary functions located in these departments, including business regulation (consumer 
protection, gambling and liquor licensing) and environmental affairs. The first row shows the 
average budget for 2009–10 for activities undertaken directly, the secondshows the budget 
transferred to external development agencies set up and controlled by the provinces (see 
Section 4.6), and the third shows the total. The average budget for each province is R512 m 
($64 m). This amounts to R4608 m ($576 m) for all nine provinces. It is the same order of 
magnitude as the budget of the national DTI – R5.4 bn ($675 m). Provincial economic 
development is clearly not a trivial activity. It is also a sizeable employer. On average, the 
departments employ 537 staff directly and indirectly. 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
The figures are converted into several ratios in the right hand column. First, the budget for 
each province is divided by the population to show the budget per head – it amounts to R79 
($10) on average. The budget is then shown in relation to the total staffing – it is about R1m 
($0.12m) on average. This is not many times the average staff salary, suggesting a focus on 
recurrent spending and the provision of services rather than capital investment. The third ratio 
is the economic development budget as a proportion of the total provincial budget – it is just 
over one per cent on average. This is very small compared with the main provincial functions 
of education, housing and social welfare. 
There are big differences between the provinces. KZN has the biggest budget by far at over 
R2.3 bn ($0.29 bn). This is 22 times higher than the Northern Cape’s. KZN also employs 
over 1400 staff directly and indirectly, compared with 146 in the Free State. KZN has the 
biggest budget per head of population at R227 ($28), which is seven times larger than the 
smallest, R32 ($4) per head in the Western Cape. KZN’s economic development budget is 
4% of KZN’s total budget, whereas it is only 0.6% in the Western Cape. 
There is no relationship between budget levels and provincial economic conditions. Provinces 
facing the greatest needs generally do not spend any more or less than the others per head of 
population. Similarly, those with the greatest economic potential, such as Gauteng, do not 
invest consistently more or less than the others, although the Western Cape is an outlier in 
spending less than the rest. The lack of any clear pattern suggests that spending levels are 
determined by provincial decisions with little or no influence from national considerations. 
One minor qualification to this is that provinces containing former Bantustans tend to have 
inherited commitments to development agencies and programmes dating back to the 1980s or 
before, which helps to explain the higher budgets of provinces such as KZN. 
 
4.6 External development agencies 
The provinces have each set up just over four external agencies on average (Table 4). They 
spend three times as much on them as they do on their own activities. External bodies are 
favoured because they permit greater focus and operational freedom from the complicated 
procedures of government. They can be more enterprising and cultivate closer relationships 
with business organisations. Yet this practice has raised concerns about diminished 
accountability and excessive effort expended on setting up structures rather than delivering 
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services (Xuza & Swilling, 2008). Most provinces have one agency that supports SMMEs, 
one that attracts inward investment and one that promotes external trade. The Western Cape 
is unusual in supporting 17 ‘special purpose vehicles’ aligned with particular sectors, such as 
oil and gas, tourism, ICT, call centres, boat building, music and creative industries. This 
follows the cluster logic in seeking to build self-supporting, collaborative business networks, 
and covers emerging as well as established industries. Although the head of department 
acknowledges that there are probably too many of these vehicles for the budget available, this 
kind of grounded approach based on substantial research and analysis could assist the process 
of national economic diversification by developing distinctive industrial strengths in each 
region. 
Gauteng has nine agencies concerned with strategic economic infrastructure, support for 
SMMEs, investment and trade promotion, international motor sports, the automotive 
industry, innovation in IT, film production, new technology based businesses and tourism. 
Towards the end of 2009 the Gauteng Motorsports Company was closed because of poor 
value for money, and early in 2010 a multi-million dollar contract between another Gauteng 
agency and the US-based media network CNBC was cancelled for the same reason 
(Benjamin, 2010). KZN has the largest agencies of all the provinces. Ithala Corporation 
provides development finance to SMMEs and other projects, and employs 977 staff through 
local offices spread throughout the province, especially in marginalised communities. Ithala 
was originally set up under the auspices of the former Bantustan in the region. At the end of 
2009 its rules were tightened to prevent loans being made to its own staff and provincial 
politicians, following revelations in the national media that substantial amounts of money 
were not being repaid. Another KZN agency, Dube Trade Port, has ambitious aims to 
develop trade, logistics and agro-processing industries related to Durban’s new international 
airport, and has an annual budget of R1.7 bn ($0.2 bn). 
 
4.7 Main partners  
Each department was asked to identify the main organisations they had built relationships 
with in order to gain insights into the kinds of partnerships they perceived to be most 
important. The responses are shown in Table 5. The dominant focus is on hierarchical 
relationships with other parts of government (the top seven rows). There is far less emphasis 
on the business sector and three provinces make no mention of any such links. This is 
surprising for organisations whose purpose is to attract and develop businesses, which 
requires understanding their constraints and working together to develop suitable 
interventions. Connections with universities and other research organisations are mentioned 
by six provinces. This is a healthy sign of improving the evidence base for policy. Labour and 
community-based organisations hardly feature at all. 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Gauteng and the North West claim that they have very extensive networks that span 
government, business and civil society sectors. KZN is slightly more selective, but also wide 
ranging. The networks for the others seem to be quite limited in scope. The networks of three 
provinces appear to be focused exclusively on other parts of the public sector. One 
acknowledged this limitation, saying that ‘Institutional arrangements need to strengthen 
partnerships with business, labour and civil society in support of the provincial growth and 
development plan’.  
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 4.8 Achievements 
The provinces were asked about their main achievements over the last five years. Table 6 lists 
all the items that featured in their responses. The items are arranged in rough order, starting 
with preparatory work or ‘inputs’ at the top of the left hand column, operational delivery or 
practical ‘activities’ below them and into the right hand column, and then tangible outputs 
and outcomes towards the bottom of the right hand column. This provides some useful 
insights into provincial views of the extent and nature of their impacts, but should not be 
regarded as definitive because of its subjectivity. 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
The emphasis in many cases was on setting up particular projects and programmes, rather 
than on what economic outputs or outcomes they had delivered in terms of jobs, investment 
or business growth. This may reflect a lack of evidence of tangible impacts, or the fact it was 
too soon to have had such effects. The most frequent single claim was to have set up some 
form of sectoral infrastructure, such as a scheme providing technical assistance to firms. This 
illustrates the popularity both of sectoral thinking and creating structures. The second most 
common set of responses was assistance for SMMEs and cooperatives – finance, advice and 
training – but again with little hard information on impacts. The third was practical support 
for municipal LED activities, such as capacity building.  
 
There was little mention of support for physical infrastructure and property, informal 
enterprises, skills training and active labour market policies to help people obtain work 
experience or employment. This is consistent with the objectives and activities discussed 
earlier. Some provinces mentioned the creation of development funds and ongoing 
programmes, which should have a sustained impact, while others seemed more focused on 
discrete projects. The limitations of proceeding by means of piecemeal projects include the 
difficulty of scaling up to achieve a significant impact and the absence of a strategic 
perspective, since ‘it is much easier to design projects than to consider, assess and address 
structural and institutional barriers to development’ (Van der Heijden, 2008:4).  
 
4.9 Concerns 
Departments were asked to identify the main obstacles they faced in promoting economic 
development. The question was open-ended, with no distinction between immediate concerns 
and underlying problems. Table 7 lists all the items that featured in their responses. A lack of 
skills and organisational capacity was the most common constraint. Six provinces mentioned 
a lack of municipal capacity to plan and implement economic programmes and projects. One 
explained that they relied on local government to deliver, but were frustrated by the limited 
skills and resources available locally. 
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
Four provinces said they were short of professional staff themselves. This was partly because 
of high turnover as skilled people moved to higher paid jobs elsewhere. This reduced 
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management continuity and institutional memory, and undermined their ability to develop 
sound policies and projects. No less than 50% of staff posts were vacant in one department 
and 40% in another, contributing to substantial underspending of their budget. Three rural 
provinces complained of a wider deficiency of professional skills within their regions, 
obstructing the ability of external public agencies and private consultancies to take schemes 
forward.  
Funding was another general constraint: five provinces said the lack of funding from national 
government inhibited delivery of their large mandate. Institutional relationships were a third 
obstacle: three provinces complained of poor communication between spheres of 
government. Two mentioned a lack of common vision and poor commitment among key 
stakeholders. One said there was poor support from national departments and another that 
government policies were contradictory. Two provinces said that elaborate legal procedures 
for environmental impact assessments caused excessive delays to development projects. 
 
4.10 Coordination problems  
All nine provinces agreed that there was a need for greater coordination across government in 
economic development. The most common concern was a lack of knowledge sharing 
between the provinces (five mentions), resulting in wasteful duplication of effort, a failure to 
learn from each other’s experience, and a tendency to ‘reinvent the wheel’ (Table 8). 
According to one respondent, ‘A wealth of knowledge exists within government and yet we 
continue to operate in silos’. 
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
Four provinces noted poor coordination between departments within their own province. One 
called for a political champion for their growth and development plan: ‘The PGDP should be 
at the centre of decision making and resource allocation in all state institutions in the 
province.’ Four provinces mentioned poor links with municipalities, including a lack of 
involvement in drafting development plans. Provinces are supposed to support local capacity 
building. Coordination across administrative boundaries was also important to reflect 
functional economic realities: ‘Given that sectoral value chains cut across municipal 
boundaries, economic planning should be the responsibility of provincial government.’  
Four said there were overlapping responsibilities between spheres of government and three 
called for improved communication between national and provincial government. Several 
provinces said that national policies for infrastructure investment were too fragmented and 
others mentioned specific areas for policy alignment where there was currently duplication, 
including support for SMMEs. Joined-up action was difficult to achieve at the provincial 
level if national policies were disconnected. 
 
5. Conclusions and implications 
Like many African countries, South Africa faces major structural problems of 
unemployment, poverty and inequality. The economy is skewed towards meeting the needs of 
the few rather than the many and generally lacks dynamism. The post-2009 government is 
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searching for an alternative policy that promotes inclusive development through more and 
better jobs. Its vision of a developmental state involves a more strategic approach based on 
long-term planning and coordination. Through concerted action it aims to set the economy on 
a more diversified and labour-absorbing growth path. 
There is a centralising tendency in this vision that could limit the contribution of provincial 
and local institutions. According to development state theories and spatial development 
theories there is a clear role for decentralised authorities to respond to the challenges and 
possibilities of local territories with tailor-made solutions based on detailed local knowledge 
and relationships. A developmental state needs to harness the collective power of government 
at every level in order to change the pattern of growth and help all areas to realise their 
potential. A stronger national economy depends on better functioning local economies and 
labour markets, based on a broader foundation of resourceful people and competent SMMEs. 
A centralised approach cannot respond with sufficient flexibility to the dynamic conditions in 
each locality and region, and exploit their specific ideas and opportunities for development. 
Empowered provincial organisations could complement the undoubted economic capabilities 
of the national state by providing additional energy, initiative and expertise to build place-
specific productive assets and distinctive sectoral strengths, not all replicating one standard 
approach. This would be assisted by the formulation of a national spatial framework and 
coordinated infrastructure plan that recognised the broad differences between places, 
including the opportunities afforded by denser settlement patterns, and the costs associated 
with distance and division (Turok & Parnell, 2009). 
Provincial authorities have gained useful experience in recent years, although their policies 
and practices are uneven and have shortcomings at present. Some strategies seem to be based 
on limited analysis of what drives and constrains economic development. There is an 
emphasis on generalised investment attraction and business support, and inadequate coverage 
of skills issues, physical infrastructure and the spatial economy. The scale of funding in most 
regions is modest considering the challenges faced and the national priority of job creation. 
Resource allocation also shows no obvious relationship to the distribution of social need or 
economic potential across the country, and the tangible impacts and outcomes are sometimes 
unclear. Organisational capacity is severely constrained in many places, and shortages of 
professional staff are widespread. There are concerns about the accountability of external 
agencies and duplication of effort. The commitment to involve business and other 
stakeholders seems very uneven. Some national departments appear unsupportive of 
provincial agendas, and many provinces in turn seem insufficiently engaged with local 
municipalities.  
All this suggests scope for improvement. There is a case for giving economic development a 
higher priority across provincial government, with their technical and organisational 
capabilities strengthened accordingly. The responsibilities of different government spheres 
should be clarified, including guidelines for problem analysis, strategy formulation, priority 
setting, resource allocation, external consultation, capacity building, monitoring and 
evaluation of impacts, and reflection on experience. Stronger backing from government and 
its agencies, and more dialogue within and between spheres would help to align policies and 
actions. Uneven capacity across the provinces means they could learn much from each other 
by sharing knowledge, skills and experience through twinning arrangements and peer review 
mechanisms. A stronger evidence base would improve understanding of local economic 




The author is grateful for the cooperation of the provincial economic development 
departments in providing valuable information and advice. The usual disclaimers apply. 
 
References 
ANC (African National Congress), 2009. Election Manifesto: Working Together We Can Do 
More. ANC, Johannesburg. www.anc.org.za/elections/2009/manifesto/ Accessed 23 
December 2009. 
Aron, J, Kahn, B & Kingdon, G (Eds), 2009. South African Economic Policy under 
Democracy. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation), 2009. Special report on global recession.  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8249411.stm Accessed 8 December 2009. 
Benjamin, C, 2010. No news was bad news for Gauteng, CNBC. Business Day, 14 April. 
Boraine, A, Crankshaw, O, Engelbrecht, C, Gotz, G, Mbanga, S, Narsoo, M & Parnell, S, 
2006. The state of South African cities a decade after democracy. Urban Studies 
43(2), 259–84. 
Buck, N, Gordon, I, Harding, A & Turok, I, 2005. Changing Cities: Rethinking Urban 
Competitiveness, Cohesion and Governance. Palgrave, London. 
Chang, H-J, 2008. South Africa paralysed by caution. New Agenda 31, 6–11. 
Cooke, P & Morgan, K, 1998. The Associational Economy: Firms, Regions and Innovation. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
DBSA (Development Bank of Southern Africa), 2008. Infrastructure Barometer. DBSA, 
Midrand. 
DTI (Department of Trade and Industry), 2006. Draft Regional Industrial Development 
Strategy. DTI, Pretoria. 
Du Toit, C & Van Tonder, J, 2009. South Africa’s economic performance since 1994: Can 
we do better? In Parsons, R (Ed.), Zumanomics: Which Way to Shared Prosperity in 
South Africa? Jacana, Auckland Park. 
Edigheji, O (Ed.), 2010. Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa. 
HSRC (Human Sciences Research Council) Press, Cape Town. 
Evans, P, 2009. Constructing the 21st century developmental state. New Agenda 36, 6–13. 
Gallagher, K & Zarsky, L, 2007. The Enclave Economy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Gordon, I & McCann, P, 2000. Industrial clusters: Complexes, agglomeration and/or social 
networks? Urban Studies 37(3), 513–32. 
Gumede, WM, 2009. Delivering the democratic developmental state in South Africa. In 
McLennan, A & Munslow, B (Eds), The Politics of Service Delivery. Wits University 
Press, Johannesburg. 
Harrison, P, Todes, A & Watson, V, 2008. Planning and Transformation: Learning from the 
Post-apartheid Experience. Routledge, Abingdon. 
ILO (International Labour Organisation), 2009. Laborsta database. http://laborsta.ilo.org/ 
Accessed 8 December 2009. 
Keating, M, 1998. The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and 
Political Change. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
Kraak, A (Ed.), 2009. Sectors and Skills: The Need for Policy Alignment. HSRC (Human 
Sciences Research Council) Press, Cape Town. 
McLennan, A & Munslow, B (Eds), 2009. The Politics of Service Delivery. Wits University 
Press, Johannesburg. 
 15
National Treasury, 2008. Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review. National 
Treasury, Pretoria. 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), 2008. Growing 
Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries. OECD, Paris. 
Parsons, R (Ed.), 2009. Zumanomics: Which Way to Shared Prosperity in South Africa? 
Auckland Park, Jacana. 
Pike, A, Rodriguez-Pose, A & Tomaney, J, 2006. Local and Regional Development. 
Routledge, London. 
Porter, M, 1998. Clusters and the new economics of competitiveness. Harvard Business 
Review, December, 77–90. 
Public Service Commission, 2007. State of the Public Service Report 2007. Pretoria. 
Public Service Commission 2009. State of the Public Service Report 2009. Pretoria. 
Robertson, M & White, G (Eds), 1998. The Democratic Developmental State: Politics and 
Institutional Design. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Rogerson, C, 2009. The turn to ‘new regionalism’: South African reflections. Urban Forum 
20(2), 111–40. 
Scott, AJ (Ed.), 2001. Global City Regions: Trends, Theory, Policy. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Sen, A, 1999. Development as Freedom. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
StatsSA (Statistics South Africa), 2010. Quarterly Labour Force Survey, October-December 
2009. StatsSA, Pretoria. 
Storper, M, 1995. The resurgence of regional economies, ten years later. European Urban and 
Regional Studies 2(3), 191–221. 
The Presidency, 2008a. Development Indicators 2008. Pretoria. 
The Presidency, 2008b. Towards a Fifteen Year Review: Synthesis Report. Pretoria. 
The Presidency, 2009. National Strategic Planning: Green Paper. Pretoria. 
Tomaney, J, Pike, A & Rodriguez-Pose, A, 2010. Local and regional development in times of 
crisis. Environment and Planning A 42, 771–9. 
Turok, I, 2004. Cities, regions and competitiveness. Regional Studies 38(9), 1069–83. 
Turok, B (Ed.), 2008. Wealth Doesn’t Trickle Down: The Case for a Developmental State in 
South Africa. New Agenda, Cape Town. 
Turok, I, 2010. Inclusive Growth: Meaningful Goal or Mirage? In Pike, A, Rodriguez-Pose, 
A & Tomaney, J (Eds), Handbook of Local and Regional Development. Routledge, 
London. 
Turok, I & Parnell, S, 2009. Reshaping cities, rebuilding nations: The role of national urban 
policies. Urban Forum 20(2), 157–74.  
Van der Heijden, T, 2008. Key Issues in Local Economic Development in South Africa and 
the Implications for SALGA. The South African Local Government Association, 
Pretoria. 
Van Donk, M, Swilling, M, Pieterse, E & Parnell, S (Eds), 2008. Consolidating 
Developmental Local Government: Lessons from the South African Experience. 
University of Cape Town Press, Cape Town. 
Woo-Cummings, M, 1999. The Developmental State. Cornell University Press, Ithaca. 
World Bank, 2009. World Development Report 2009: Shaping Economic Geography. The 
World Bank, Washington. 
Xuza, P & Swilling, M, 2008. Institutional arrangements for local economic development 
implementation in South Africa. In Van Donk, M, Swilling, M, Pieterse, E & Parnell, 
S (Eds), Consolidating Developmental Local Government: Lessons from the South 
African Experience. University of Cape Town Press, Cape Town. 
 
 16
Table 1: Labour market conditions in the provinces 
 EC FS GP KZN LP MP NW NC WC RSA 
Unemployment rate 
Oct–Dec 2009 (%) 
27.0 25.3 25.7 19.2 26.9 26.6 27.0 24.9 21.5 24.3 
Employment rate 
Oct–Dec 2009 (%) 
31.4 42.2 52.2 37.6 29.0 39.6 35.9 40.9 53.9 41.5 
Loss of employment 
over last year (000s) 
95 39 330 222 -40 53 109 26 37 870 
Loss of employment 
over last year (%) 
7.0 4.7 8.1 8.4 -4.6 5.7 12.2 8.2 1.9 6.3 
Source: Statistics South Africa, Quarterly Labour Force Survey, October-December 2009 (StatsSA, 2010) 
Notes: The employment rate (or ‘absorption ratio’) is the proportion of the working age population that is 
employed. Minus figures for LP indicate employment growth. 
 
 







Growth 9 Shared/inclusive growth 4 
Employment 9 Poverty reduction 4 
Sustainable growth 8 Informal/second economy 3 
Diversification 6 Transformation 3 
Global competitiveness 5 Good governance 3 
Knowledge economy 2 Food security 2 
Higher value added 2 Environmental sustainability 2 
Local linkages 2 Decent work 1 
Regional competitiveness 1 Broader econ. participation 1 
Productivity 1 Livelihoods 1 
Innovation 1 Spatial balance 1 
Enterprise 1 Wealth redistribution 1 
Sources: Provincial survey responses and strategy documents 
 17
Table 3: Provincial economic development activities 








Business development  Human development  
Inward investment 9 Basic skills 0 
Trade/export promotion 9 Vocational training 4 
Sectoral support 9 Public works 1 
Tourism 9 Labour market matching 0 
Business associations 1 Empowerment 5 
Science/R&D/innovation 1 Talent attraction 0 
SME advisory support 9 Physical infrastructure  
SME financial support 8 Transport and logistics 5 
Cooperatives 8 Supply of serviced land 2 
Informal enterprises 3 Business premises 1 
Institutions  Public realm 1 
Munic. capacity building 5 Place image and branding 3 
Public-private 
partnerships 
4 Regeneration of old 
industrial areas 
1 
Leadership 2 Industrial develop. zone 4 
Economic research 4   
Arts & cultural activities 3   
Sources: Provincial survey responses and strategy documents 
 
Table 4: Provincial economic development resources  
 Average per 
province 
 Average per 
province 
Financial (Rm)  Ratios  
Internal ED budget  128 Budgets per capita (R) 79 
Budget transferred 
to agencies 
384 Budgets/staff (R) 0.96 m 
Total ED budgets 512 Total budget/Province 
budget 
1.3% 
Staff    
Department staff 135 Number of agencies  4.5 
Agency staff 402   
Total staff 537   















National departments 8 Financial institutions 2 
National agencies 5 International donors 1 
DBSA 3 Professional bodies 1 
Other depts. in the province 6 Local universities 6 
Prov. arms length agencies 5 Training colleges 1 
Municipalities 6 Research/consultancy 
bodies 
5 
Other provinces 2 Stats SA 1 
Chambers of commerce 4 SA Reserve Bank 1 
Other business associations 5 Organised labour 2 
Property developers 1 Civil society organisations 1 
Sources: Provincial survey responses and strategy documents 
Note: BEE - black economic empowerment; EPWP – expanded public works programme; SDI – spatial 
development initiative 
 





Create forum for policy 
discussion 





3 Targeted business support for 
disadvantaged groups 
3 
Develop a strategy 3 Infrastructure for informal 
traders 
1 
Support municipal LED 6 Science park/bus. incubator 2 
Create a new agency 2 Specialised business park 2 
Prepare business plan(s) 3 Funding industrial & 
commercial property 
2 
Organise a BEE conference 1 University-business collab. 2 
Organise a cultural festival 2 Supplier devt. programme 2 
Exhibition for SMMEs 1 Programme to support co-ops 5 
Attend international trade 
exhibition 
2 Major road infrastructure 1 
Supporting sectoral infrastr. 8 Create major visitor attraction 1 
Launching IDZs/SDIs 4 Develop an internat. airport 1 
Levering public investment 2 Develop major logistics hub 1 
Levering private investment 4 Attracted inward investment 2 
Create province growth fund 3 New businesses started 2 
Advice/training for SMMEs 5 Actual job creation 3 
Financial aid for SMMEs 6 Temporary jobs via EPWP 2 
Information centre – SMMEs 1 Skills training 1 









Skills and capacity  Coordination  
Lack of municipal capacity to 
plan & implement projects 
6 Poor coordination between spheres 
or departments 
3 
Shortages of professional 
skills in the department 
4 Lack of common vision among 
key stakeholders 
1 
Shortage of professional skills 
in private consultancy 
1 Low commitment of key 
stakeholders 
1 
Lack of capacity in agencies 1 Lack of influence over agencies 1 
General low skills/shortage 3 Contradictory govt requirements 1 
Resources  Poor support from national depts. 1 
Lack of resources from govt. 
to deliver a large mandate 
5 Lack of strategic perspective 1 
Lack of resources for R&D 1 Legislative obstacles to BBBEE 1 
Lack of venture capital 1 Delays caused by Environmental 
Impact Assessment requirements  
2 
Lack private sector match 
funding 
1 Lack of govt support for 
vulnerable sectors 
1 
Lack of municipal resources 1 Wider economic obstacles  
Implementation  Recession, tight credit, strong 
rand, less private investment 
1 
Inadequate implementation of 
beneficiation programme  
1 Narrow economic base 1 
Poor implementation of PPPs 1 Cannot attract FDI to province 1 
Slow implement. of BBBEE 1 Extreme poverty, weak tax base, 
serious social problems 
2 
Sources: Provincial survey responses  
Note: BBBEE – broad-based black economic empowerment; PPP – Public-private partnerships 
 





Poor coordination between 
departments in the province 
4 Fragmented legislation, 
regulations and policies 
2 
Poor links between province 
and its agencies 
1 Restructure MinMec to focus 
on key policy priorities 
1 
Poor links between province 
and municipalities 
4 Many disjointed initiatives 2 
Lack of knowledge sharing 
between provinces 
5 Need practical cooperation 
on joint projects 
1 
Need more communication 
between national & provinces 
3 Poor coordination between 
SMME support agencies 
2 
Need more transparency in 
decision making 
1 Poor coordination of skills 
programmes 
1 
Poor alignment and overlapping 
responsibilities between spheres 
4 Poor coordination of 
infrastructure investment 
2 
Lack of joint planning between 
spheres 
2 Need more monitoring and 
evaluation 
1 
Sources: Provincial survey responses  
Note: MinMEC is a regular forum between national and provincial ministers of economic development. 
 
